Aaron Swartz's "A Censorship-Resistant Web," is a good high-level view on distributed hash-cacheing, a fairly credible system for augmenting the web to make it harder to censor and spoof sensitive information:
What's nice about this system is that it gets you censorship resistance without introducing anything wildly new. There are already certificate authorities. There are already hash-to-URL servers. There are already mirrors. There's already Tor. (There's already tor2web.) The only really new thing specific to censorship resistance is URL-to-hash servers of the form I described, but they're very simple and hopefully uncontroversial.
There is some work to be done stitching all of these together and improving the UI, but unlike with some other censorship-resistance systems, there's nothing you can point to as having no good purpose except for helping bad guys. It's all pretty basic and generally useful stuff, just put together in a new way.
And even if you don't like my particular distribution system, if you agree with the notion of authentic pages you can distribute them through whatever network you like.